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Capital Accumulation and Annuities in an Adverse Selection Economy
ABSTRACT
This paper suggests that adverse selection problems in competitive annuity
markets can generate quantity constrained equilibria in which some agents
whose length of' lifetime is uncertain find it advantageous to accumulate
capital privately. This occurs despite the higher rates of return on
annuities. The welfare properties of these allocations are analyzed.It is
shown that the level of capital accumulation is excessive in a Paretian











This paper investigates the nature of annuity markets and the
composition of private portfolios when there exists cx ante private
informationregarding individual specific survival probabilities. The
existenceofsuch private information leads to equilibrium annuity
contracts which constrain subsets of agents with respect to the quantity
ofannuities that they can purchase.When the magnitude of agents'
investments in some non—annuity type asset is non—observable, these
quantity constraints may be sufficiently binding to lead sane agents who
do not havebequestmotives to finance a portion of theirold age
consumptionvia bequeathable wealth. This can occur despite the fact that
the equilibrium rate of return on bequeathable wealth is lower than the
equilibrium rate of return on annuities •Givenuncertain lifetimes, the
voluntary private accumulation of bequeathable wealth generates
involuntary bequests.
In contrast to Kotlikoff andSpivak(1981), Abel (1985) and Eckatein,
EichenbaumandPeled(1985a), emongothers,who exclude annuity markets on
an a riori basis, the quantity constraints on purchases of annuities in
our model emergeasan equilibrium responsetoadverse selection problems.
The explicit derivation of the nature of equilibrium annuity contracts
allows us to identify the types of agents who will be quantity—constrained
with respect to annuity purchases. In addition we are able to discuss the
welfare properties of decentralized equilbria in our adverse selection
economy.Given a characterization of the set of informationally
constrainedPareto optimal allocations, webriefly discuss a welfare
improving role for government when involuntary bequests exist.2
Inthe particular model that we consider individuals do not have
bequest motives.This does not reflect any belief on our part that
bequest motives do not play an important role in generating
intergenerational transfers.Instead, this assumption is made for
convenience and because the qualitative features of our results will be
robust to the inclusion of standard types of bequest motives (see for
example Barro (1974), Shezhinski and Weiss (1981) and Abel (1984)). It is
true that if agents had bequest motives, not all intergenerational
transfers would be involuntary.However some individuals would still be
quantity—constrained with respect to annuity purchases so that some
personalconsumption would be financed from bequeathable wealth.Put
somewhat differently, bequeathable wealth uld not be held solely for
bequest purposes •Thisis consistent with findings by Diamond and Hausman
(1982), King and Dicks—Mirseaux (1982), Bernheim (1984) and Bernheim,
Shleifer and Sunmers (1985) which implythat retired people dissave from
non—annuitytype assets in order to finance their consumption.Such
behavior is inconsistent with models in which agents can purchase, without
quantity constraints, actuarially fair annuities, regardless of whether or
not they have standard types of bequest motives.
The remainder ofthispaper is organized as followe. In section 2 we
presentthe basic features of the model.Decentralized equilibria are
discussed in section 3 while welfare considerations and the policy
implications of ourresultsareanalyzedin section 4. Finally, section 5
containssome concluding remarks.3
2.The Model
The population is partitioned into two distinct groups, A and B. For
each type A agent there are rtypeB agents, y > 0.The members of each
group live at most two periods, the first of which they survive with
certainty.Death can occur at the beginning of the second period with
probability h £{A,B},o<A < B < 1.With a continuum of
agents, a proportion (lIIh) of the old members of group h will die at the
beginning of the second period. Throughout, we assume that the survival
probability of iygivenagent is known only by the agent in question.
Thus *iile each agent correctly perceives that his probability of dying at
the beginning of the second period is (luh), h £(A,B},he does not know
thether any other given agent is a member of group A or B.
Letdenote the consumption of a type h agent in period i, hc{A,B},
ia1,2.We assumethatis zero ifthe agent is not alive in period2.
Preferences over lifetime consumption (C,C) of a type hagentare given
by U(C) +IhU(C),h c {A,B}, where U() is strictly increasing and
strictlyconcave.Inaddition limU'(x) a0and urnU'(x) a. The
x0
marginal rate of substitution betweenC1and C2 for a typeh agent is
givenby
Agents of both types are endowed with W units of a storable
consumption goodinthefirstperiodoftheir lives.The technology of
storageis such that one unit stored inthe firstperiod yieldsunits of
the goodinthesecond period, d > 0.
Let qh(ee)denote theoptimal storage undertaken byamember of
group h, given exogenous good endoaents of e1 and e2 in periods 1 and 2.
Notice thatql!hie1,e2) is theunique solution to theproblemMax {U(e1 —q)+
uhU(e2+.sq)},h =A,B. (2.1)
q>O
Since TB> it folloi that qB(e1,e2) > qA(ee) for all (e1,e2) c
with strict inequality whenever qB(e,e) > 0. Agents' indirect utilities
defined over (e1,e2), to be denoted by '(','), are defined as
Vh(e1,e2)U(e1 — qh(e1,e2)] +IIhU(e2
+
sSqt'(e1,e2)],
h c (A,B}. (2.2)
Giventhese definitions we proceed now to describe the competitive
equilbrit.mi of this economy.
3.CompetitiveAnnuity Markets
In this section we consider the competitive provision of annuities in
the economy described above.In doing this we utilize two related
concepts of equilibrium in adverse selection environments due to
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977). Competitionong
annuityproviders involves the specification of both "prices" and
"quantities" in the sense discussed by Rothschild andStiglitz and
Wilson.2Under both ofthe definitions of an equilibrium which we
consider,an annuity contract is viewed as a two—dimensional vector (S,R)
where S denotes the premiumpaidin the first period of a purchaser'slife
and SR is the corresponding return to the agent if he is alive in the
second period.
We define
L.h(SIR) =MaxIU(W..S—q)+nU(RS+dq)},h c (A,B} (3.1)
q>05
as the indirect utility that a member of group h derives from the annuity
contract(S,R), taking into accounthis optimal non—insurance portfolio
decisions.
A Rothschild/Stigj.itz (El) equilibrium is a set of contracts such that
(1) agents choose contracts and non—insurance assets to maximize
their expected utility;
(ii) all contracts in the equilibrium setearnzero profits;
(iii) there is no contract outside the equilibrium set that is
preferred by someagentandwhichmakes non—negative expected
profits whenofferedby one firmunderthe assumption that the
set of contracts offered by other firmsremainsunchanged.
A Wilson (E2) equilibrium is the seme as the El equilibrium except that
firms'expectations are modified by assuming that eachfirm willcorrectly
anticipate which of those policies that are offered by other firms will
become unprofitable as a consequence ofanychanges initsown policies.
The firm then offers a new policy only ifit makesnon—negative profits
after all the other firms have maie the expected adjustment in their
policy offers.
It is convenient to divide annuity contract equilibria into one of
two catagories, (a) pooling equilibria in which all agents buy the seme
annuity contract, and (b) separating equilibria in which agents with
different survival probabilities purchase different annuity contracts. We
begin by notingthat, as in standard adverse selection insurance contexts,
theredoes notexist an El pooling equilibrium.3Consequently, ifan El
equilibriumexists, it is a separating one. Since each contract offered
must earn zero profit, each group's contract is actuarially fair in the
sense that its rate ofreturnequals 61h'h c {A,B}.6
The fact that some agents may choose to finance second period
consumption by holding bequeathable wealth follows from the nature of the
equilibrium annuity contracts. In particular, as Theorem 1 indicates, the
competitive provision of annuities guarantees that agents with high
survivalprobabilities will not be constrained regarding annuity
purchases. However, agents with low survival probabilities may be
sufficiently constrained with respect to annuity purchases that they find
it advantageous to hold capital as veil as annuities, despite the fact
that capital is dominated with respect to its rate of return. The
following theoremwhich isproved in Appendix A, characterizes the
equilibriumof this economy.
Theorem1
If an El equilibrium exists, the equilibrium contracts are given by
(SA,6/UA)and(S8,6/lIs) where isthe solution to
Problem1: Max U(W —S)+BU(6S/!B) S >0
and is the solution to





Theset of Elequilibrium contracts is affected in an important way
by the possibility of unobservable capital accumulation by agents.7
Specifically, group B's incentive cpatibility constraint must reflect
the fact that the members of that group can invest in capital as well as
buy the group A annuity contract.As a result, the possibility of
unobservable capital accumulation may make the members of group A worse
off without affecting the welfare of the members of group B.This
possibilityis depicted in Figure 1.When the capital technology is
unavailable to private agents, the El separating equilibrium consists of
the contracts defined by points B andG.Theseare given by Theorem1
assuming that q(,')0.bwever,whenagents of type B wishtostore
privatelyfrom allocationG, the equilibrium contracts aregivenby points
B and H.The point H corresponds to the groupA equilibrium annuity
contractthatsolvesproblem2of Theorem1 •Theallocation H has the
propertythat if a member of group Boptimally invested from thatpoint,
by movingdown from Honthe broken line, he could obtain the final
allocation represented by point D which lies on the seme indifference
curve as the point B.
Let(SG,/IIA) and denote the annuity contracts
correspondingto the points G and H respectively.While the annuity
contract for group Bspecifiesthat group's rina]. allocation, this is not
necessarily the case for group A, since q&(W...SH,SH6/u) may be positive.
Hence, because of quantity rationing in the group A equilibrium annuity
contract, the members of that group may hold positive quantities of t
distinct assets, one of which has a higher rate of return from their point
of view. This possibility is depicted in Figure 1, where the members of
group A attain the allocation H' by storing privately from H.Put
differently, the members of group A may hold capital and annuities even in
the absence of bequest motives.8
Until now our discussion has assumed that an El equilibrium exists.
The following theorem, which is proved in Appendix B, provides necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of an El equilibrium.
Theorem 2
Let (Ci,C) denote the consumption allocation chosen by consumer A if
he must buy the contract (SA,6/TA) which solves problem 2 of Theorem 1.
An El equilibrium does not exist if and only if A's indifference curve
throih (Ci',C) intersects the budget line C1 +c2/! : W,whereis the
economy—wideactuarially fair rate ofreturn given by=
Theorem2 implies that the existence of an El equilibrium is made
moretenuousbyagents' ability to privately store capital. This follows
from thefact thatthe conditionmentioned in Theorem 2is more likely to
besatisfied the rse is theinitial position ofthemembers of group A.
Thepossibility of private capital accumulation has precisely this adverse
effect on the incentive compatible annuity contract for group A.
As Wilson (1977) has shown, the E2 equilibrium concept complements
theRothschild—Stigljtz El concept in the following my: when the economy
is one for which an El equilibrium exists, it is also the E2 equilibrium;




where is the economy-wide actuarially fair rate of return (defined in
Theorem 2).Since the choice of S is unconstrained (aside from the
non—negativity condition), the solutionto(3.14),denotedSi', has the9
propertythatq5!,5)=0.Since qB(5P5P) > qA(5P5P), group B may
store positive amounts of the consumption good in an E2 pooling
equilibriii. Thisisto be contrasted with the separating equilibrium in
which the members of group A, butnotthe members of group B, may engage
in private storage.
The result thatagentswhodonothavebequest motives may hold
bequeathable wealth was derived undertheassumptions that private storage
activities and individual, survivalprobabilitiesareprivateinformation.
Inorder to validate our claim that involuntary bequests can be attributed
to the unobservability of certain forms of bequeathable wealth, we now
examine the equilibrium of our model under the alternative assumption that
private holdings of capital are publicly observable.Under these
circumstances one can condition the terms ofanannuity contract on the
level of capital held by the purchaser of the contract.
In genera], different levels of private capital held by agents will
reveal their types. We assume therefore that the members of group B, the
high risk group from the point of view of annuity issuers, will be offered
the El group B equilibrium contract, which coincides with the full
information group B contract, whenever their type is revealed.It follows
that the members of group B will, always hold the sameamountof capital as
a member of groupAwhen both purchase the same contract.
Consider first the situation in which bequeathable wealthisheld in
aE2 pooling equilibrium whenprivatestorage is unobservable.At the
allocation which corresponds to th. annuity pooling contract,
represented by point Fin Figure 2, onlymembers ofgroupB wish tostore
privatelysinceMRS(eP.eP) =l/< l/. Since qA(eF,eP) =0,agents who
storepositive amounts of the good,will be revealed asmembersof group B10
if storage is observable and receive the contract (5B6/) which
corresponds to point B. However, the members of group B prefer (e,e) to
(e,e) since otherwise the equilibrium uld havebeena separating one
tobegin with. It follo that the members ofgroup B prefer the pooling
contracteven if they cannot engage in private storage.Thus, the
observability of private non—annuity type assets suffices to eliminate
private capital accumulation (and involuntary bequests) when there is an
E2 pooling equilibrium in annuity markets.However the equilibrium
pooling annuity contract itself doesnotchange.Instead, the
observabi],jty of private storage simply eliminates the ability of certain
agents to engage in additional. non—insurance savings activities.
Consider next the situation depicted in Figure 1, in bthich the
separating equilibrium with unobservable storage involves the holding of
bequeathable wealth by the members of group A.In that equilibrium
private holding of capital allows the members of group A to increase their
utility by moving from allocation H to allocation H'.In order to be
incentive compatible, the equilibrium group A annuity contract must have
the property that the final group B allocation obtainable from it lieson
the indifference curve (labelled 'B in Figure 1) passing through thegroup
B annuity contract.Thus, when storage is observable, the binding
constraint on group A's final allocation is that it lies along13.From
group A's point of view the best actuarially fair allocation on that curve
is denoted by the point G.An annuity contract attaining allocation G may
require the imposition of no private storage in order to be incentive
compatible.Such a constraint on private savings may be binding for the
members of both groups at allocation G. However, this constrainedannuity
contract is still preferred by the members ofgroup A to any other11
contractwhich isboth incentive compatible and allowspositive storage of
thegood (such as the annuity contract H and the corresponding consumption
allocation represented by thepoint H').Thus,asin the case of the E2
poolingequilibrium, agents will not hold bequeathable wealth ifall
non—annuitytype assets are observable.
In concluding this section we briefly consider an additional market
that is made possible when agents with uncertain lifetimes hold capital.
Specifically, suppose that in the first period of their lives, agents
issue claims to one unit of the consumption good, redeemable in the second
period only if the issuer of the claim is not alive. Since the level of
private capital holdings, which backs such claims, is not observable in
the first period, the supply of these claims will be infinite at any
positive price. It is possible, however, to get around this difficulty by
considering the following extended annuity contract.In addition to a
first period contribution level and .a rate of return payable ifthe
annuity holder is alive in the second period •thepurchaser of the annuity
agrees to preocit ownership of his private capital holdings ——whatever
they may be —to the annuity issuer ifhedies in the second period. This
precoemitment of estates potentially allowe for rates of return in excess
of group specific actuarially fair rates. If the equilibrium turns out to
be a separating one, then this extensionis superfluous;the group B
contract makes private capital holdings unattractive for members ofthat
grotç, but the implied incentive compatibility constraint prevents any
improvementinthe rates of return for groupA.Moreover, without cross
subsidizationofcontracts across different groups, precommitment of
estatesby members of group A cannot be used to improve the terms of group
Bcontracts•Onthe other hand, the nature ofthepooling equilibrium may12
change as a result of introducing this type of extended annuity contract.
In particular, the rate of return payable on annuity investments will be
higher than !ifthe members of group B choose to hold capita]. privately.
In this case, private capital acci.anulation by the members of group B does
notleadto involuntary bequests.Instead, their estates revert to
annuity issuers and are re—distributed, in the form of higher rates of
return on annuities, to thesurvivingmembers of groups A andB.
4 The Inefficiency of Multi—Asset Portfolios
In this section we establish the result thatany equilibrium in which
somebequeathablewealth is held by private agents cannot be
(infortuationallyconstrained) Pareto optimal. We then show that a
mandatory annuity program, which is actuarially fair in an economy—wide
sense, results in an equilibrium without involuntarybequestswhich Pareto
dominates theinitialequilibrium.
Pareto optimal allocations are defined to be the solutions to
particular types of social planning problems.The choice variables of
these problems are referred to as type—specific handouts of t period
consumption levels,and aredenoted by (C', C), hc{A,B}.The important
feature of this social planning problem is that theability of private
agentsto accumulate capita]. in an unobserved manner prevents the social
planner from specifying final consumption levels.
Assumingthatfirst periodendoirenentsandtheproceeds fromstored
output are the only sources of goods in thefirstand second periods
respectively,the resourceconstraints on the choice variables, expressed











Theincentive cnpatibility constraints are formulated in terms of
agents' indirect utilityfunctions, (2.2),which are definedover
consLuiptionhandouts,
c,C) >vhcC',C')h,h'U,BJ (4.4)
Theset of Pareto optimal allocations is given by the solutions to







by choice of tc1,C,C, C}.
We begin characterizing the solutions to Problem 3byconsidering
pooling allocations of the formC C =C,,j z1,2.




whereT =z/(l+y)+ theweighted average survival probability,
so thatflA<T<IIB< 1.1z;
The following theorem, which is proved in Appendix C, characterizes
the unique pooling allocation which can be Pareto optimal.
Theorem 3 -
Ifc
= = and = solvesProblem3,then(!1,!2) is





Noticethat condition(ii) of Theorem3impliesthatMRSh(11,22) =
h''hc{A,B}.Since <1/6, he{A,B}, it follows that no agent will
wish to store privatelyat the unique candidate for an optimal pooling
allocation.The following theorem, which is proved inAppendix D, states
thatno allocation which induces private storage is Pareto optimal.
Theorem
If solves Problem 3thenqA(CA,CA) =qB(CB,CB)=o.
Itfollows that an equilibrium cannot be Pareto optimal if
involtitary bequests are generated.Since the members of group A may
store privately in an El separating equilibrium and the members of group B
may store privatelyin anE2 poolingequilibrium, neither ofthese
equilibriawill, in general, be Pareto optimal.Unlike the separating
equilibrium which may be optimal if no private storage occurs an E215
pooling equilibrium never results in an optimal allocation regardless of
whether or not individuals engage in private storage.By Theorem 3,a
pooling allocation can be Pareto optimal only if it coincides with the
(!1,Z2) allocation, which has the property thatMRSh(!1,!2)
=
ha{A,B}.}bwever at the E2 pooling equilibrium, MRSA(C,C) =
Thusthisequilibrium cannot be Pareto optimal.
Eckstein, Eichenbaum, andPeled(1985b) analyze the potential welfare
enhancing properties of a mandatory economy—wide actuarially fair annuity
progrem in an economy when no capital exists •Herewe consider the
effects of suchapolicy conditional on the initial non—intervention
equilibrium being one in which private storage occurs• Thespecific
policy to be analyzed requires thateachagent contribute X units of the
consumption good in thefirstperiod in return for ffxunitsofthe good in
the second period if he is alive.Thusagent'seffective lifetime
endoentofthe consumption goadis(W—X,!X).We nowshowthatitis
possible to choose I so that the resulting equilibrium Pareto dominates
theinitialequilibrium which corresponds to I equal to zero.
We first consider the case in which the equilibrium corresponding to
I z0is an £2 poolingequilibrium,with pooling contract (#,ff)and
qB(i_sP,sP)> 0. This situation is described in Figure 3bythe point ,
whichcorresponds to theequilibriumpoolingannuitycontract, andpointB
which corresponds to thefinalallocation attainable by themembersof
groi B by privat, storage from thepoint P.
Considera mandatory annuity progrem withI =S.Under these
circumstances theresidualdemandforannuities results inaseparating
equilibriumin which no agent engages in private accumulation of
bequeathablewealth. Group B'sfinal allocation in the new equilibrium is16
the allocation most preferred by its members on a budget line with slope
11B"5originating at P.This allocation is represented by point B' in
Figure 3.Since this budget line represents a higher rate of return than
the one used to obtain allocation B from the point P, the members ofgroup
B are clearly made better off.The indifference curve of type B agents
through B' intersects the budget line of group A that passes through the
pointP (which has a slope of at G'. Notice that at B, U'(C) =
sothat it is necessarily the case that U'(C') < sSU'(C').
Thus G must lie on a higher indifference curve ofgroupAthan the one




Next we consider the case in which the initial equilibrium
(corresponding to X equal to zero) is El separating equilibrin In
bthich the members of group A engage in positive storage.This situation
isdepicted in Figure 1bythe allocations (C,C)and (C1, C) where
thelatter is achieved by the members of group A via privatestorage from
their annuity allocation (C, C). The existence of amandatory annuity
program (!, if) thatresultsIn a Pareto superior allocation with no
privatestorage Is established in the following constructive way.First
find !suchthat the point (C', C') lies on the group A actuarially fair
line from (W—!, )6, i.e.
—
— AL'6
Given the modified endoaient vector (W—,!), the equilibrium in
residual annuity markets results in the finalallocationsB' forgroup B,17
* * B'B'
















subjectto(C1, C2) < U( 1
+flBU(2
A'A' *
Thesolution (C1 ,C2 ) willcorrespond to point Ginfigure k if
B1'G' *
MRS(c , C ) < 1/5, andto the point Hotherwise.
Notice thatnecessarily




Thesecond inequality follows from the fact that at H, MRSA(C, C) =
1/6,while the movement from H'to (C', Ct') involves anintertemporal
rateofsubstitutionof whichexceeds 6.Moreover,since (C1,C2
)
1*1*
liesabove the set((C1,C2)IU (C1) :
&U(C2)}, MRZA(C. ,C'j) < 1/6.
Thisestablishes both thatthemembers of group A arebetteroff at
(C',C')and that no private storage will be undertaken by those
individuals18
5. Conclusion
This paper has investigated the existence of involuntary bequests
when agents, who havenobequest motive, live an uncertain anountoftime
and agent—specific survival probabilities are private information.
Involuntarybequests emerge asan equilibrium phenomenonbecause ofthe
natureof the equilibrium annuity contracts in our model economy.
Two assumptions arequiteimportantforourresults •First, itmust
bethecase that the issuers of annuities must be able to monitor the
numberof annuities purchased by any given agent.Secondly, it is
critical for the existence of involuntary bequests that there be some
forms ofbequeathable wealth that arenotobservable to annuity issuers.
The importance of thefirstassumption canbeseen by noting that it is a
necessary condition for the existence ofquantity constraints.In
particular,the applicability of the Ibthschildand Stiglitz(1976) and
Wilson(1977) definitions of competitivf equilibrium In adverse selection
markets depend crucially on the monitorability of contracts. The role of
the first assumption is highlighted in this paper by considering the
equilibrium then this assumption is not true •()ir results are consistent
with other findings in the literature which indicate that the
non—observability of private capital accumulation canchangethe nature of
optimal contracts in fundanenta].ways.For ezanple, Scheinloiian andWeiss
(198$) consider a class of economic environments in rEiIch individually
optimal savingsandlimited borrowingatmarket clearing interest rates
completely exhaust the opportunities for feasible risk sharing anong
agents with Idiosyncratic and privately observed income.These authors
analyze a twoperiodmodeliniIich agents have the possibility of saving
(but not borrowing) at the sane rate as financial intermediaries and where19
the level of saving is not observed by financial intermediaries. Optimal
contracts in this envirornnent involve letting agents borrow or lend at
market interest rates, subject to the constraint that debt is limited to
the maximun present value that an agent can repay in the second period
with probability one. This is not the case hen the magnitude of private
savings are observed by financial intermediaries.
Weconclude by reiterating that the paper abstracts from the
existence of bequest motives. This does notreflect any belief on ow
part that bequest motives are unimportant in explaining the total
magnitude of intergenerational transfers. The assumption that agents have
no bequest motives is made only to simplify the analysis and because our
qualitative results will not be affected by the presence of standard types
of bequest motives. It iscertainly true that the ratio of involuntary to
voltmtarybequests will be affected by the existence of bequest motives.
However, that ratio will not necessarily be zero as existing models of
agents with izicertain length of lifetimes tho have access to actuarially
fair annuity markets Imply.Put sewhat differently, se agents with
bequest motives may continue to finance their oi future consumption by
holdirse bequeathable wealth in their portfolios despite the existence
of fully organizedannuity markets.20
AppendixA: Proof of Theorem 1
The requirement that each contract earns zero profit implies group
specific actuarially fair rates of return on each group's annuities.
We prove the rest of the theorem by contradiction. Suppose that
and
6/IrA)arethe El equilibri contracts, and that
does not solve problem 1.By the definition of problem 1 the members
ofgroupBprefer (5B6/) to(B/) Thus LB(SB,4/IIB)>
> LB(A6/u) so that (SB,4/irB) and (A6/)do not
violategroup B's incentiveccpatibility condition.Regardless of
the sign of LA(,6/IIA) —LA(sB6/n)the contract (3B,6,/) makes
nonnegativeprofits.Thus (A6/) and (Bd/u) violate the
definitionof an El eiilibriizsetofcontracts. Consequently the
lgroup B equilibriizi contract must solve problem 1.







ft A' Thesolution to problem I isdenoted by S. By asst.nption, L (S,6/ll) AA C ft >1.. (5 ,d/II) and (S,s/IIA) earns non—negative profits since S is, by
the definition of the problem that itsolves,incentive ccnpatible.
Thus (,6/nA) could not have been the group A El equilibri. Since
it is straightforward to establishthat the constraint (A.l) in
problem Iisalwaysbinding,thesolutiontoproblemIis thesameas
thesolution to problem 2 in Theorem 1.
Q.E.D.21
Appendix B: ProofofTheorem 2
Define the sets =((C',C)cR2IVA(Ci,C) > and r =
CCClC2)ICA
+ = W}.We first show that an El equilibrium does not




Then (WS,Sif)££2Afl 1' if this intersection is non—empty.It followe
thatLA(SP,R)> LA(SA,d/n) f. A 0.The contract (S,) will
thereforebe purchased bymembers of group A if offered, and it willearn
positive profits iftheyalone purchase it,andzero profits otherwise.
We now prove that if r =, thenan El equilibrium exists. This
isaccplishedby systematically showing that no single contract (S,R)eR
can break the equilibrium set of contracts ((SA,d/nA),(SB,d/IIB)} defined
inTheorem 1.
Msizie then that there exists a contract (S,R) that attracts members
ofgrotA or B or both awey fr their respective contracts. Then one of
the following mustoccur:
Ci) L.B(s,R) > 4/fl)
(ii) LB(S,R)<L.B(SB,d/fl) LCS,R) >
UnderCi), (S,R) makesnon—negativeprofits only ifit ispurchased by
members of both groups, so that we also have LA(S,R) >L&(SA,4/iiA).But
because QAf)r0,thelast inequality can hold only ifR>if, inwhich
case (S,R) must yield negative profits.
To see that (ii) cnot hold we show that any contract (S,R) yielding
non—negative profits and satisfying LA(S,R) >L(SP,4/nA)implies LB(S,R)
>LB(SB,4/nB). This is achieved by considering twoexhaustive and
mutually exclusivecases forprivate storage activities fr the contract22
1.qB(w_AsA6/n):0.




wtiereqA(w_SA, S/fl =osinceqB(w_sAS 6/nA) =0.
Let attainLA(S,R), possibly by storing privately from (S,R).
Then U() +flAU()) U—SA) +1IAU(S6/5),or equivalently,
RAIU)—U 61A
> U (W—sA).U()




Finally, since q'(W—S,SR) < qB(w_s,SR) we have that
LB(S,R)=V8(i,)> U()+3U() >
By construction, IP(S8,4/113) =LB(SPa,6/UA)so the desired contradiction
obtains.
BA
2. q (W-.S 6/UA) > 0.
In order to offer a contract (S,R) thatyieldsnonnegative profits
andsatisfiesLACS,R) > LA(SA,6/UA) it must be that
(W—s) +(I/6)Rs> w—s' +(1/6)(sA6/nA)
and R<6/flA. Consider then the straight line given by D :
((C1,C2)1C1+(1/6)C2 =(W—S)+(1/6)RS}.By normality, ifan agent of type
B canfreely choose any allocationon D he attains a utility levelthat
exceeds
LB(SA,sS/nA).If thenon—negativityrestriction on B's storage at
(S,R) is bindinginthe sense thatU(W_S)+IIBU(SR)< LB(SA,6/IIA) then
necessarily one also has U(W_S)+nAU(SR) < LA(SA,6/IIA). Q.E.D23
AppendixC: Proof of Theorem 3






on ,bythe members of groups A and B, respectively. It follows thatX
x8. IfX =(X1X2) ,solvesProblem 3 then X =X(t)=(X1(t),X2(t))
=
+ (1—t) Xfor some t c[0,1].This canbe verifiedby observing
that MR?(X1(t),X2(t))> T/6, (MRSh(X1(t),X2(t)) < T/), for both h:A and
h:B if t>1, (t<0). Consequently,MRS&(X1,X2)< T/6 < 1/6 for anysolution
(X1,X2)toProblem 3in $. Moreover,it can also be sho that
MRSB(X11X2)< 1/6 for suchsolutions.Specifically, if atany pooling
allocation(X1,X2)
£ MRSA(X1,X2)
<1/6 while MRSB(X,X) > 1/6, then
thereexists a Pareto dominating, incentive compatible allocation
(C4,C,C,C) which is obtainable from (X1,X2) as folloi:
(C,C2) $(Xl—cB,X2+dtB), B>°
(C,C)z(X1.c,X2••4CA) 'A>0•





But (C.2) implies only that 'A(lEB).r(B/(lIIA) < 'B sothatgiven £3>O
one can choose 'A a
Supposenowthat thereexists a pooling allocation (C1,C2),$which
solves Problem 3 but Fails to satisfy U (C1) =6U(C2).We prove the
existence of a Pareto dominating, incentive compatible allocation for each
of thepossibletwocases,U'(C1) (6U(C2)andU'(C1)>2k
Case a:U(C1) < 6U(C2).
Let:
(C,C) =(C2_CB,C2+rc3), tB > 0
(C,C) =(Cl+CA,C2_rGA), CA > 0. (C.3)
For (C,C) and (C,C) to dinate(C1,C2) for the members of group A and
B respectively, r must be chosen such that MRS8(C1,C2) >hr >
MRSA(C1,C2). By the hypothesis of case a, ,.tB(c1,c2) >°we pick
anr such that
MRSB(C1,C2)> hr > Max{11B/6, MRSA(C1,C2)}. (C.k)
Aggregate consistency requires (C.1) andIIArCA +
sothat
(t%_lIAr)GA (6_UBr)TGB.By thechoice ofr, (6—113r)> 0, and
since113 >11A'wealsohave (11Ar)> 0. Consequently,formallenough
and an r that satisfies (C.k), chooseCA>O such that 0 < CA
Then the allocation given by (C.3)
feasible, and Pareto superior to (C1,C2).
It remains to show that is incentive canpatible given
agentst ability to storeprivately fromany allocation.It was
established that for anypooling solution to Problem 3,1/> MRS3(C1,C2)
>MRSA(C.C2). Since C < C and C >C2, we have h/s > MRS3(C1,C2) >
MRSB(C,c), so thatq(C,C)0. Also, r waschosen such that hr<
MRS3(C1,C2) < 1/i, so that(C,C) lies to the right ofthe locusof
allocations attainable by private storege from (C,C);i.e., C +(h/6)C > C +(h/)CA. Consequently, by choosingtB smallenough, we have
v3(c,c) > Finally, note that q3(C,C) =0implies that
qA(C)=0,so that VA(C,C) > U(C1) +nAtJ(C2) > U(C) +
vA(C1,C2). This concludes the proof by contradiction forcase a.
Case b: (J'(C1) >25
Onemay repeat the same proof with a slight modification resulting
fran the factthat inthis case MRS3(C1,C2) < II/6 andMRSA(C1,C2)
<
We choose an r such that MRSA(C1,C2) < hr ( Mm "A16' MRSB(C1,C2)}.
Q.E.D.
AppendixD: Proof of Theorem
If C =C,
j =1,2then the result followe immediately from Theorem
3.Forthe remaining (separating) solutions to Problem 3,weprove the
theorem by deriving a contradiction in each of the following cases:
Case a: q'(C,C) > 0 and q3(C,C) =0.
Caseb: qA(CA,,CA)>0 andqB(CBCB) > 0.
Case a
Consider an alternative allocation in thich members of groups A and B
receive and respectively,where
=(C&_qA(C&,C&), cA .,. 6qA(cA.cA)).
Then,aggregateconsistency, (i.3), requires that
+IB(_)/6] ( (l_lI)q'(C,C).
Ifwe let = (C—t,C+rc)thenfor any r > 0thereexists c > 0
such that satisfiesaggregate consistency.Next we show that r
and c can be chosen in an incentive compatible way to yield a strictly
better allocation to agents of type B.
Recall that qB(CBCB) =oimplies qA(CB,cB) =0.By continuity of
qA(.,.) and the fact that B > 11A' there exists a neighborhood of (C,C),
denoted by D, on *ich q'(,')iszero.26
Pick an r such that MRSA(C,C) < hr < MRSB(C,C), and let be
such that for any e contained in (O,), (C—c, C+rc) is contained in D.
For c contained in (O,) define the functions Qh(), hc{A,B}, by
Qh() =U(C—c)+nhU(C2c).
Then, dQB(O)/dc =_U(CB)+rU(C) > o, since 5B(,) > hr.
A''
Similarly, dQ (O)/dt = —U (C1) +rflAU(C2) < 0, since MRS (C1,C2) < hr.
Letting be given by such choices of r and,we have
> > vc',cyB(A.A)
where the first inequality follo from thestrict monotonicity of
atzero and the assimtption thatqBc,)=o;the second fromthe incentive
compatibilityof and thelastequality follo from the
fact that the best allocations for typeBattainable by private storage
from (C,C) and areidentical. Likewise, < V(C,C) <
Thus, is implementable, creates a
slackin constraint (1) ofProblem3,andattains the same valueforits
objective functions.
Case b
Let =(C_qh(C,C),c+4qh(C,C)), ht(AB).This new
allocation frees resources equal. to X=(1_)qR(C,C) +(1)qB(C,C)
forpotential distribution in thefirst period. Since qB(B,) o, it
followsthat qA(B,B) =0.Notice that VA(,) = >vc8,c
> '1'2 where the last inequality followa from thefact that
is obtained from (C,C) by storing too much from A's viewpoint. At the
same time, vBP,) =vB(c,cA)< v3(C,c) =B(3B) Thus
is incentive compatible. Then, given the slack in group A's
incentive compatibility condition and the resources available for
distribution in the first period, it is straightforward to show that there
always exists an allocation (,C) such that vBcc,c) > which
does notviolategroup A's incentive compatibility constraint.This
establishesthe contradiction for case b,
Q.E.D.27
References
Abel, A.B. "Precautionary Saving and Accidental Bequests." American
Economic Review 75 (September 1985), 777—791.
___________"CapitalAccumulation andUncertainLifetimes with Adverse
Selection." Mimeographed.. Boston:HarvardUniversity, 1984.
Barro, R. J. "Are Goverrmtent BondsNetWealth?"Journal of Political
Economy 82 (December 1974): 1095—1117.
Barro, R. J. and Friedman, J.W. "On Uncertain Lifetimes," Journal of
Political Economy, 85, (August 1977), 843—849.
Bernheim, B. D. "Dissaving After Retirement: Testing the Pure Life Cycle
Hypothesis." Mimeographed. Palo Alto: Stanford University 1984.
Bernheim, B. D., Shleifer, A. andSunmiers,L.H. "Bequests as a Means of
Payment."Journal of PoliticalEconomy 93(December 1985): 1045—1076.
Diamond, P. A. andHausman,J.A. "Individual Retirement and Savings
Behavior." Mimeographed.Boston: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1982.
Eckstein,Z, Eichenbaum,M. and Peled, D. "The Distribution of Wealth and
Welfarein the Presence of Incomplete Annuity Markets." Quarterly
Journal of Economics 100 (April 1985a): 787—806.
___________,"UncertainLifetimes andtheWelfare Enhancing Properties of
Annuity Markets and Social Security." Journal of Public Economics 26
(April 1985b), 303—326.
Eichenbaum, N. and Peled, D. "An Intertemporal Multi—Asset Adverse
Selection Economy." Mimeographed.Pittsburgh: Carnegie—Mellon
University, 1984.
Jaynes, G. "Equilibrium In Monopolistically Competitive Insurance
Mwkets." Journal of Economic Theory 19 (December 1978): 394—422.
King,N. A. and Dioks—Mirseaux, L. "Asset Holdings and the Life Cycle."
Economic Journal 92 (June1982):233—253.
Kotlikoff,L. J. andSpivak, A. "The Family as anIncomplete Annuities
Market." Journal of Political Economy 89 (April 1981): 372—391.
Rothschild, N. and Stiglitz, J. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance
Markets: An Essay in the Economics of Incomplete Information."
Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (November 1976): 624—649.
Scheinlanan,J.A.and Weiss, L. "Savirs as Insurance."Mimeographed.
Chicago:University of Chicago, 1984.28
Sheshin3ki,E. and Wei$s, Y. "Uncertainty andOptimalSocial Security
System3.1' Quarterly Journal of Economica, 96 (May 1981): 189—206.
Wil$on,C. "A Model of Inzurance Market3 with Incomplete Information."
Journal of Economic Theory 16 (December 1977): 167—207.
Yaari, M. E.,"Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the
Consumer." Review ofEconomic Studies 32 (1965):137—150.29
Footnotes
1.This time separable specification of preferences is consistent with
Yawl (1965) and Barro and Friedman (1977), among others, who adopt
such a specification in order to parameterize utility over lifetime
consumptionbundles in the face of uncertain lifetimes.
2. Ouruseof these equilibrium definitions is motivated by the
assumptionthat annuity providers can fullymonitor all annuity
purchasesmate by their clients. Incontrast, when the monitoring of
contractsis not possible, it is more natural to model canpetition
emong annuity providers as occurring solely with respect to the rate
of return on annuities with no restrictions on coverage levels. Abel
(198'3) and Jaynes (1978), among others, analyze different adverse
selection markets under the assumption that monitoring is not
possible. Some qualitative features of the equilibrium derived in
this paper are quite sensitive to the equilibrium concept which we
use.
3.Thisresult is proved in Eichenbaum and Peled (1984). Since agents
can undertake private storage in addition to purchasing annuity
contracts, verification of the incentive compatibility of the
breakingcontracts must take intoaccount the possibility of
nonobservable storage by private agents. . See.Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977) for extended
discussionsof the absence of cross—subsidization inan El
equilibrium.
5.By Theorem 2, the allocation pair (B',G') constitutes an El
separatingannuityequilibrium giventh.effective endoent vectorP
since group A'sindifference curve through G' doesnotintersect the
econywide actuarially fair line.
6.solves the linear equation
(W—f..C)/(C — =
7.Since the indifference curve of a member of group A through H' does
not intersect the econany wide actuarially fair line, neither will
th ind4fereng cv e through He, so that the pair ofcontracts
(Ca' ,C),(C1,C)constitutes a separatingequilibriumgiventhe
moaifies endoaient ector (w—!,!fl).C
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